Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Conceptual scheme: Language and objects (ontology) are assumed as conceptual scheme by some authors. - In contrast, the content is formed by stimulus influences. In particular, between W.V.O. Quine and D. Davidson the status of the conceptual scheme is disputed. See also reference system, language, meaning._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Barry Stroud on Conceptual Schemes - Dictionary of Arguments
I 212 Conceptual scheme/Quine/Stroud: the concepts of philosophical inquiry are already developed in other contexts. - Yet they are just as suitable. - There are no other "philosophical" terms outside. - There is no external point of view. - The situation is just as it is for Neurath’s ship. >Neurath's ship, >External/Internal, >Circular reasoning. Philosophy/Quine: Philosophy is only more general, not of a different nature. - There are only "other categories". - However, the question of the existence of, for example, numbers is special. >Ontology, >Ontology/Quine, >Numbers, >Numbers/Quine._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
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> Counter arguments against Stroud
> Counter arguments in relation to Conceptual Schemes
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-28